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NO JOY IN MUDVILLE TONIGHT: THE IMPACT
OF "THREE STRIKE" LAWS ON STATE AND
FEDERAL CORRECTIONS POLICY, RESOURCES,
AND CRIME CONTROL
David Schultz t
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time-
To let the punishment fit the crime'
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the time Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon ran for
the presidency in 1964 and 1968 respectively, Americans have consid-
ered crime as a national problem. 2 Politicians have mobilized this fear of
crime for electoral purposes, running campaigns to "get tough on crime"
by building more prisons, limiting prisoners' due process and appellate
rights, cracking down on allegedly lenient judges, and by giving law en-
forcement officials more latitude and ability to investigate, apprehend,
and arrested accused individuals.
3
During the 1990s the number of Americans viewing crime as a ma-
jor national problem continued to increase. For example, in 1991, only
6% of the population described crime as the most important problem
facing the country, whereas by 1993, 16% of Americans held that view.
4
As a result 66% of the Americans supported making it more difficult for
t Professor, Graduate School of Public Administration, Hamline University, adjunct
Professor, School of Law, University of Minnesota. J.D./Ph.D. University of Minnesota; M.A.
SUNY Binghamton; M.A. Rutgers University; B.A. SUNY Binghamton. An earlier version of
this article was presented at the New York State Political Science Annual Convention, May 7,
1999, St. Johns University, Jamaica, New York. I would like to thank participants at this
convention for their helpful comments.
1 William Schwenck Gilbert, The Mikado; or the Town of Tiflu, in THE COMPLETE
PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SuiuivaN 382 (1976).
2 STUART A. SCHEINGoLD, THE PoLITcs OF LAW AND ORDER xi, 76-79 (1984). Gallup
Poll and other public opinion surveys throughout the 1960s and 1970s indicated that Ameri-
cans consistently ranked crime as one of the most pressing problems facing the county or
otherwise demonstrated public support for a variety of get tough measures, including an in-
creasing support for the death penalty from the 1970s onward. Id. at 45-49.
3 Id.
4 GEORGE GALLUP, JR., Tam GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1993 168 (1993); GEORGE
GALLUP, JR., Tam GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1994 135 (1994).
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those convicted of violent crimes to be paroled; 5 59% supported signifi-
cant bail restrictions for those accused of violent crimes;6 and 48% sup-
ported increased sentences for all crimes.7 Similarly, public opinion
supported limits on death penalty appeals; extending the death penalty to
cover new offenses; and giving police greater latitude to stop and search
accused criminals and detain suspects for twenty-four hours without
bail.8 In addition to these typical panaceas to address crime, the public
also endorsed other crime control measures including boot camps for ju-
venile offenders (66% support);9 fines or prison sentences for parents of
juvenile criminals (48%);1o and community notification for released sex
offenders (89%).11 But perhaps one of the most popular measures pur-
posed during the early 1990s were "three strike" laws under which a
person convicted of three serious felonies would automatically be locked
up for extended period of time including life without parole. While ha-
bitual or repeat offender laws were not new to the American criminal
justice system, 12 the intensity of support for three strike laws - 74% of
the American public supporting these laws in 199413 - led to the passage
of these laws by twenty-two states and the federal government between
1993 and 1995. Ironically, all of these laws were adopted at a time when
FBI Uniform Crime Reports were indicating that the crime rates in
America were actually stabilizing or going down and not up. 14
Three strike laws were heralded by its proponents as the new get
tough way to reduce crime and get habitual offenders off the streets.' 5
Conversely, the opponents described'these laws as costly, cruel and unu-
sual punishment in terms of disproportionality of sentencing, and certain
to produce an abundance of geriatric inmates in overcrowded prisons.16
As the fifth anniversary of some of these laws approach, it is appropriate
to ask what impact three strike laws have really had. Have they reduced
crime, increased corrections costs, or taken hundreds or thousands of vio-






11 GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1994 133 (1994).
12 See infra notes 17-85 and the accompanying text.
13 GEORGE GALLUP, JR., Ti GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1994 134 (1994).
14 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality? 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 394, 395-96 (1997) [hereinafter "Vitiello I"]. Scheingold, supra note 2, at 43(
noting that public fears of crime have consistently gone up in the last twenty years at times
when crime rates and victimization has actually decreased).
15 Id. at 412.
16 Ilene M. Shinbein, "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Good Political Slogan to Re-
duce Crime, But a Failure in Its Application, 22 NEw. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
175, 200-201 (1996).
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lent criminals off the streets and placed them into overcrowded prisons?
It seems that there are no clear answers to these questions.
This article examines the impact and efficacy that the three strikes
laws have had upon state and federal corrections policy, resources, and
crime control. The claim to be made in this article is that three strikes
laws have had almost no demonstrable impact upon violent crime both
because the three strikes laws have been underutilized, dnd because, for
reasons to be specified below, the habitual violent offenders whom these
laws appear to have been intended to apprehend have not necessarily
been incarcerated under these laws. In addition, because of their underu-
tilization, three strikes laws have not necessarily led to the social costs
critics claimed, but nonetheless, where these laws have been employed
they had a significant impact upon trials, the racial composition of pris-
ons, and their application in plea bargaining. The laws have not had
either the positive or negative effects supporters and critics prophesied.
Instead one could describe the laws as at best harmless symbolic meas-
ures, or at worst a waste of resources that mislead the public into believ-
ing something is being done to address crime when, in fact, little has
been done.
To substantiate these claims, part one of the article will examine
briefly the legal background of habitual offender statutes. Part one then
will examine the political forces leading to the passage of three strikes
laws, indicating the variety of laws that states and the federal government
did adopt. Part two examines the use and impact of these laws in several
states and with the federal government. The conclusion will address
some the lessons to be learned from these laws.
I. HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS: THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL BASEPATH TO THREE STRIKES
A. PROPORTIONALITY AND EARLY HABrruAL OFFENDER LAWS
Recidivism and chronic criminal behavior have been vexing
problems for the American criminal justice system since the colonial
days. In attempt to deal with these problems the courts had upheld colo-
nial government and state laws imposing increased sentences for those
previously convicted or crimes. 17 These laws implicated questions re-
garding how to deal with those individuals who continue to commit
crimes despite the imposition of punishment including imprisonment.
One solution, of course, was an attempt to consider past criminal behav-
ior when determining punishment for a new crime, and in 1912 the
17 See Ilene M. Shinbein, Three-strikes and You're Out": a Good Political Slogan to
Reduce Crime, but a Failure in its Application, 22 NEw ENG. J. ON CRXM. & CrV. CoNrFrm-
NrmNT 175 (1996).
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Supreme Court first ruled upon a habitual offender law in Graham v.
West Virginia.'8
1. Graham v. West Virginia
In Graham at issue was a state law which added five years to a
prison sentence for anyone who had been previously convicted for a sim-
ilar crime, while someone who had been twice convicted of a similar
offense would receive a life sentence. 19 In 1898 Graham pled guilty to
grand larceny, and three years later he pled guilty to burglary. In both
cases he served time in jail. Subsequently, in 1907 Graham was again
arrested for larceny, and in 1908 he was sentenced to life imprisonment
under the West Virginia habitual offender law.20 Graham appealed his
life sentence, claiming "(1) that he has been deprived of his liberty with-
out due process of law; (2) that he has been denied the equal protection
of the laws; (3) that his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the
United States have been abridged, and that he has been denied his immu-
nity from double jeopardy; and (4) that cruel and unusual punishment has
been inflicted. ' '2' The Court rejected all of these claims.
First the Supreme Court first observed that English and American
courts had long recognized the practice of "inflicting severer punishment
upon old offenders" and, therefore, there was no due process violation.22
Second, the Supreme Court rejected Graham's double jeopardy argu-
ment, stating that the increased penalty he received for his third offense
was not inflicting double punishment for the past offenses. Instead, the
defendant was merely being punished for his third offense.23 At no point
was his enhanced punishment directed towards new convictions or in-
dictments for previous offenses and therefore the double jeopardy provi-
sion was not implicated.24 Third, the Supreme Court rejected Graham's
equal protection claim that he was discriminated against because he was
a former convict,25 stating both that proper due process protections were
afforded before the life sentence was imposed,26 that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not demand a strict equality, and that it may recognize
differences in punishment based upon whether one had been previously
convicted of a crime.27 The Supreme Court noted also that the defendant
18 Graham v.West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
19 W.Va. Code §§ 4475-4476, 4692-4696 (1906).
20 224 U.S. at 620.
21 Id. at 623.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 623.
24 Id. At 624.
25 Id. at 629.
26 Id. at 630.
27 Id.
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had been given a sentence similar to that of what others who had com-
mitted three offenses would have received. Given this and since proper
procedures had been followed before imposing the sentence, neither were
Graham's privileges and immunity infringed nor could the sentence be
considered cruel and unusual punishment.28
While Graham upheld what could be described an early forerunner
of a three strikes law, in 1927 California did in fact pass an early version
of a three strikes law that sentenced thrice convicted nonviolent offend-
ers to life in prison. 29 California repealed this law in 1935, but eleven
other states had similar habitual offender laws. By 1980, only West Vir-
ginia, Washington, and Texas had these laws still on the books.
30
2. Weems v. United States
The decision in Graham demonstrated that the Court would uphold
enhanced criminal penalty provisions. Yet the demands of proportional-
ity in sentencing in other cases limited significantly the types of
sentences that could be imposed for certain offenses, thus calling into
question the constitutionality of some habitual offender laws. For exam-
ple, in Weems v. United States31 the issue was whether a Philippine law
calling for a fine and imprisonment ranging from twelve to twenty years
in cases where a public official falsified a public document was cruel and
unusual punishment.32 At the time the defendant Weems was indicted
and convicted, the Philippines was part of the United States and it had its
Bill of Rights modeled upon the United States Bill of Rights including a
"cruel and unusual punishment clause." 33 Weems was convicted of falsi-
fying payroll information, and given a sentence of fifteen years of prison
with hard labor and a fine of 4,000 pesetas.34 Weems' sentence was
subsequently upheld by Philippine courts, but the United States Supreme
Court reversed.
In reversing the sentence as being cruel and unusual punishment,
the Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive review of the original de-
bates surrounding the crafting of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. The court arrived to the conclusion that "it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to of-
28 Id. at 630-31.
29 1927 Cal. Stat. 634.
30 Frank A. Zieglar & Rolando V. DelCarmen, Constitutional Issues Arising From
"Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation 3, 7-9 in THREE SmucEs AND You'RE Our: VEN-
GEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY (David Schichor and Dale K. Sechrest eds. 1997).
31 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910).
32 Id. at 359.
33 Id. at 367.
34 Id. at 366.
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fense.' '35 This proportionality requirement was a part of the mandate of
the cruel and unusual clause. This meant that the sentence imposed upon
Weems was disproportionate to the crime committed, especially given
that sentence could be imposed for falsification, even though no one was
hurt by the falsification. 36 The Supreme Court invalidated the entire law,
not just the sentence given to Weems, finding that even the minimum
sentence imposed for the crime would have constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.
37
3. Recent Proportionality Decisions
Weems stood out for the proposition that disproportionate sentences
for repeat offender laws might be struck down if the sentence imposed
seemed out of line with the type of past offenses that might implicate
these habitual offender statutes. Similarly, in other cases such as Robin-
son v. California decision, 38 the Court drew limits as to what the state
could punish, [here, mere addiction to drugs,]39 and incorporated the pro-
portionality requirement to state offenses. In Trop v. Dulles40 the Court
stated that the power to punish must "be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards," and that the meaning of the cruel and unusual clause
of the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning "from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'4' The
Eighth Amendment appeared to stipulate limits on punishment and in-
clude a proportionality requirement. Yet, despite producing inconsistent
results, the Supreme Court's decisions in four cases paved the way for
the eventual constitutionality of most if not all three strikes types of laws.
In Rummel v. Estelle42 the defendant Rummel was convicted in
1973 for obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. This conviction came
after a 1964 conviction for $80 in credit card fraud and a 1969 conviction
for forging a check worth $28.4 3 Upon his third conviction, Rummel was
sentenced to life under a Texas statute that provided for life imprison-
ment for anyone convicted of three felonies.44 Rummel appealed his
sentence, claiming that life45 for these crimes was cruel and unusual
35 Id. at 367.
36 Id. at 363.
37 Id. at 381.
38 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
39 The count held that merely being addicted to drugs could not be illegal.
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
41 Id. At 101.
42 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980).
43 Id. at 265.
44 Id. at 266. Rummel was sentenced to life under the then Texas Penal Code Ann.
§ 12.42(d) (West 1973).
45 Id. at 270-71. Specifically, Rummel did not challenge enhanced penalties for the three
convictions, but instead the life sentence.
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punishment and a disproportionate sentence to the three crimes which
resulted in his steeling less than $240 in total.46 While the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his sentence, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed on the proportionality grounds relying on Weems.47 On
rehearing the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated,48 and on certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court upheld Rummel's life sentence.49
In rejecting Rummel's claims, the Supreme Court first disposed of
his arguments that recent cases striking down death as a disproportionate
penalty5o were inapplicable to his case because death was a unique type
of penalty that had attached to it special proportionality issues.51 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court distinguished Rummel's claims from those
found in Weems, arguing that in the latter case it was not merely the
length of the incarceration that was at issue. Instead, the hard labor and
other terms of confinement were also important to the court finding the
sentence to be cruel and unusual and disproportionate. 52 Third, the
Supreme Court argued that objective and not merely subjective factors
were required to determine what constituted disproportionality. Appeal-
ing merely to judges' personal preferences was an inappropriate way to
determine what is cruel and unusual or disproportionate. 53 Once death is
no longer an issue, according to the Supreme Court, determinations to
what constitutes an appropriate sentence are subjective and best left up to
local legislatures to decide.54 Finally, to buttress its other claims, the
Supreme Court also cited Graham v. West Virginia as precedent, in-
dicting that it had already upheld what it felt to be a very similar life
sentence.
55
In Hutto v. Davis56 the Supreme Court again defered to local legis-
lature determination what was an appropriate punishment for a crime.
Here, at issue was two concurrent twenty year sentences and $20,000
fine for the possession of nine ounces of marijuana. In overturning
habeas corpus based on proportionality and the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause, the Supreme Court indicated that its Rummel decision stood
46 Id. at 265-66. Rummel did not raise a facial claim against the Texas statute, instead he
argued that it was unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at 268. Furthermore, in Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) the Court had upheld facial challenges to this Texas statute.
47 Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc), vacated on reh'g,
587 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1978), affd, 385 U.S. 263 (1980).
48 Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 653-654 (5th Cir. 1978).
49 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 264.
50 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 172 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279-80 (1972).
51 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272.
52 Id. at 273.
53 Id. at 274-5.
54 Id. at 282.
55 Id. at 276-77.
56 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982).
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for the proposition that sentencing guidelines are generally policy issues
for the legislatures and not the courts.5 7 This means that the lower fed-
eral courts should not second guess the lines of initial punishment drawn
by local legislatures and should follow Rummel in order to prevent anar-
chy within the federal judicial system.
58
Rummel and Hutto appeared to sanction broad deference to legisla-
tures' desire impose severe sentences, even in cases of habitual offend-
ers. However, in Solem v. Heim59 the Court reversed itself and
invalidated a version of a three strikes law. In Helm, at issue was a life
sentence imposed on a defendant under a South Dakota statute for issu-
ing a bad check in the amount of $100.60 The normal sentence for this
crime was a maximum five years and a $5,000 fine, but because the
defendant had six prior felony convictions-three for burglary and one
felony each for obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny,
and driving while intoxicated 6 '-the South Dakota recidivist statute
mandated a life sentence. The state supreme court and the court of ap-
peals denied habeas corpus and affirmed the conviction, but the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeal overturned.62 The Supreme Court affirmed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first indicated that propor-
tionality was deeply rooted in English and American law,63 and that it
applies to all types of sentences including felonies even where death is
not a penalty.64 Rejecting Rummel's claim that death is different in terms
of assessment of proportionality, the Supreme Court indicated that it saw
no reason to draw a "distinction with cases of imprisonment" versus
death.65 Powell stated that:
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a crim-
inal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for
which the defendant has been convicted. Reviewing
courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to
the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess
in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts pos-
sess in sentencing convicted criminals. But no penalty is
per se constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v.
57 Id. at 374.
58 Id. at 375.
59 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
60 Id. at 281.
61 1&
62 Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
63 Id. at 284.
64 Id. at 288-89.
65 Id.
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California, a single day in prison may be unconstitu-
tional in some circumstances. 6
6
To determine whether a sentence was disproportionate, the Court
proposed a three part test, looking to: 1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; 67 2) a comparison of the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction;68 and 3) a comparison of the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions.69 This three part test would guide the courts in determining pro-
portionality under the cruel and unusual punishment clause.70 Applying
the test in this case the Supreme Court found that Helm's sentence was
disproportionate in terms of all three criteria and, therefore, violated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause.71 Moreover, Powell distinguished
Rummel from Helm, noting that the former had a possibility of parole
attached to the life sentence whereas in the latter case there was no such
possibility.
72
The dissent argued that the Helm test would be difficult to adminis-
ter, and that it would lead both to confusion in lower courts and to signif-
icant reversal of sentences. Neither proved to be the case: only four state
cases were reversed on the basis of the Helm test in eight years.73 De-
spite this lack of confusion, the Supreme Court again appeared to reverse
itself in Harmelin v. Michigan74 and returned to its Rummel standards.
In Harmelin the defendant was convicted under Michigan law of
possessing 672 grams of cocaine and sentenced to a mandatory term of
life in prison without possibility of parole.75 He appealed asserting that
under the Helm test his sentence was disproportionate.76 In upholding
his conviction, Justice Scalia rejected the use of the Helm test to deter-
mine the constitutionality of disproportional sentences,77 claiming that
"5-to-4 decision eight years ago in Solem [v. Helm±] was scarcely the
expression of clear and well accepted constitutional law and that the de-
cision was wrong."'78 Instead, Scalia returned to the claims found in
66 Id. at 290.
67 Id. at 290-91.
68 Id. at 291.
69 Id. at 291-92.
70 Id. at 292.
71 Id. at 303.
72 Id. at 302-03.
73 Clowers v. State, 522 So.2d 762 (Miss. 1998); Ashley v. State, 538 So.2d 762 (Miss.
1989); Gilham v. State, 549 N.E.2d 555 (Oh. 1988); Naovarth v. State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev.
1989).
74 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
75 l at 961.
76 Id. at 961-62.
77 Id. at 962.
78 Id. at 965.
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Rummel that sentencing decisions are basically legislature determina-
tions, and that, generally, the courts should not intervene. 79 Moreover,
according to Scalia, while a severe sentence may be "cruel" it is not
necessarily unusual, and unless it were both, it would not violate the
Eighth Amendment.80 After an extensive historical review of punish-
ments under the Eighth Amendment, Scalia found that proportionality
was not a right necessarily protected under this Amendment, 81 and,
therefore, the defendant's life sentence was not unconstitutional.
Scalia's opinion was not widely endorsed: only Rehnquist joined in
the outright rejection of the Solem test.82 Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
joined in by two other Justices, accepted a narrow proportionality prin-
ciple that applied only to "greatly disproportioned" sentences. 83 Accord-
ing to Kennedy, Solem and Rummel shared similar concerns about
deference to state legislatures, and the need for objective decisions. He
concluded that:
[T]he primacy of the legislature, the variety of le-
gitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal
system, and the requirement that proportionality review
be guided by objective factorsinform the final one:
The Eighth Amendment does not require strict propor-
tionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportion-
ate" to the crime.
84
Applying the Solem test, Kennedy found that the sentence was not
so disproportionate that it violated the Eighth Amendment, and, there-
fore, he upheld the life sentence accepting Michigan's determination that
the linkage between drugs and violent crime warranted imposition of se-
vere sentences to address this type of criminal activity.85
By 1991 the Supreme Court had reversed itself numerous times on
the issue of proportionality and constitutionality of habitual offender stat-
utes. Yet, after Harmelin it appeared that only "greatly disproportionate"
sentences would be invalidated under the Solem test, and that, in general,
there were no real impediments to the imposition of a repeat offender
laws. In effect, the legal basis for three strike laws had been cleared.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 966-67.
81 Id. at 985.
82 See DAVID A. SCHULZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMrTH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF
JuSTCE ArroNIN ScALiA 191-92 (1996) (discussing Scalia's opinion in this case).
83 Id. at 996.
84 Id. at 1001.
85 Id. at 1002-03.
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II. "STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE": THE POLITICAL
CONTEXT OF THE THREE STRIKE LAWS
In addition to clearing the legal basis for the enacting three strike
laws, several political and social factors contributed to the raise of pub-
lic demand for enactment of three strike laws.
A. "SWING AND A MISS: STiUKE ONe": CRIME IN THE EARLY 1990s
There was a general impression that violent crime was on the rise in
the early 1990s, even though the overall crime rate and victimization was
still lower than it had been several years before. More important, peno-
logical research indicated that repeat offenders were a major source of
crime. By some estimates, "as few as 5 percent of all offenders may
account for over half of all robberies and other violent crimes for gain.
86
This research suggested that in many cases simple incarceration for a
longer period of time of some habitual criminals would reduce the
number of crimes. In addition, there was a growing belief that rehabilita-
tion as a penological goal had failed. Increasing recidivism rates, indi-
cating that larger percentages of inmates were committing crimes and
returning to jail again suggested that incarceration longer periods of time,
was a solution to the perceived rising [number of crimes] [crimes] [crime
rates] .87
Tougher mandatory minimums were depicted as one way to deter
criminals, yet there was little evidence that such laws had much impact.
For example, Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins' study of
mandatory minimum laws found little impact in deterring crime.88 Stud-
ies in Massachusetts, Michigan, Florida, New York, and elsewhere
reached similar conclusions. 89 Good social science evidence was thus
available to frame the debates on three strikes to show that mandatory
minimums and enhanced penalty laws had little impact on crime. How-
ever, while social scientists often like to believe that their research will
have policy import, it appears that sentencing studies had little impact
on the three strikes debate.
86 Lawrence W. Sherman, Patrol Strategies for Police, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY
145, 160 (James Q. Wilson ed. 1983).
87 See, e.g., JAMiEs Q. WILSON, TINING ABOUT CRMnm (2 nd ed. 1983) (suggesting that
rehabilitation as a form of punishment has failed and that incapacitation is the best choice as a
justification for incarceration).
88 FRANKIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 125 (1995).
89 Dale Parent, Key Legislative Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory Sentencing, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH m ACION 1, 2 (January, 1997).
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B. "FOUL BALL, STRIKE Two": PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDIA
COVERAGE
In the early 1990s, a significant portion of public viewed crime as
the most serious noneconomic problem facing the country and demands
to get tough on crime were hardening. 90 Both media accounts of crime
on the local news that created the impression of escalating violence on
the streets and the use of the crime by politicians as an election issue
fueled this demand.91 In 1992, President Bush ran for reelection calling
for the passage of three strikes laws, while in1994 Governor Wilson in
California rode to reelection on a get tough on crime platform demanding
the passage of a similar law. 92 Finally, several high profile cases, such as
the Polly Kass murder by a released criminal in California, also drove
the public demand to increase penalties and adopt what would come to
be known as three strikes legislation.
Thus, debates about tougher criminal sentences in 1993 came in the
context that could be called a frenzied emotional setting. Fears of crime
and victimization were running high. Politicians were appealing to this
mood, and the media was increasing its coverage of violent crime render-
ing the local news as no more than "crime, weather, and sports." Given
this climate, three strikes laws were passed by twenty-two states and the
federal government between 1993 and 1995. Exactly what offenses were
counted as strikes rather than foul balls or how the laws in each case
worked varied significantly.
The state of Washington, the first state to adopt three strikes legisla-
tion,93 did so via a voter initiative that supported the law by a three-to-
one margin.94 The Washington law would lead to life imprisonment
without parole if a defendant is convicted of a third offense from a pre-
scribed "most serious offense" list. This list of offenses includes actual
or attempted class A felonies, including murder, extortion, robbery, rape,
and some forms of vehicular homicide and class B felonies if there is a
finding of sexual motivation. The prosecutor does not have to charge
under the three strikes law, but if she does and the defendant is found
guilty, the judge must impose the mandatory sentence.
90 See supra notes 4-7.
91 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISToRY 452
(1993).
92 See Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 122-23, 418-20.
93 WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.94A.392 (West. Supp. 1996). and see Vitiello, supra
note 14 at 395-96.
94 John Clark, James Austin, D. Alan Henry, "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Review
of State Legislation, NAT. INST. JUST. RESEARCH N BRmF 1 (January, 1997).
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California was the next to adopt three strikes legislation in a
charged political atmosphere.95 Several events were critical to its pas-
sage. On June 29, 1992, Kimber Reynolds was murdered by a career
criminal. This prompted to the victim's father, Mike Reynolds, to work
with a judge on a draft of the original version of the three strikes law.
96
In 1993, Reynolds secured a state assembly sponsor for what would be
Assembly Bill 971. The bill was killed in committee, and Reynolds
sought to use the state initiative process to place the measure on the bal-
lot. Despite National Rifle Association and California Corrections and
Peace Officers Association support, signature gathering was going
slowly and the bill appeared to be doomed were it not for the murder of
Polly Klass in late 1993.
97
Polly Klass's murder by repeat offender Richard Allen Davis en-
joyed significant state and national media coverage. The coverage pro-
duced a boom to the signature gathering process, with over 50,000
signatures secured within three days of Polly Klass' murder.98 In 1994
Assembly Bill 971 returned to the state legislature but under very differ-
ent circumstances. Public outrage over the Klass murder was high, me-
dia coverage of the bill intense, and, most importantly, 1994 was an
election year for the California Governor, the state legislature, and the
United States Congress. Nationally, the Republican Party and its "Con-
tract with America" made crime a center stage issue. President Clinton
was also talking tough on crime, demanding that his new crime bill be
passed. In California, Reynolds secured Governor Pete Wilson's support
for his three strikes initiative and the latter linked together passage of the
bill and his reelection.99
There were now several contrasting bills in the California state leg-
islature, each tougher than the other. One option, the three strikes with
life and no parole, was latched on to by the Governor even though other
three strikes options existed and called for tougher sentences for targeted
offenders with costs much lower than the three strikes option supported
by the Governor. Supporters of the life without parole version of three
strikes claimed significant savings associated with three strikes. They ar-
gued that the overall cost in the reduction of crime would outweigh any
of the costs associated with increased incarceration and prison construc-
tion. A RAND study indicated that the net overall savings would be $23
95 See Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 409; see also Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and
the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democracy 30 Loy. L.A.L.REv. 1643, 1672
(1997) [hereinafter "Vitielo II."].
96 See Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 410.
97 See id. at 410-12.
98 See id. at 412.
99 See id. at 412-14.
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billion by the year 2000,10 and that targeting specific repeat offenders
would have a significant impact crime decreasing the crime rate between
22% and 34%.101 RAND studies contested the savings, indicating that
the proposed law would lead to a 120% increase in the prison budget 102
and an overall cost of $5.5 billion to implement three strikes.' 0 3 Despite
evidence of the costs, indications that state revenues were unavailable for
corrections, and claims that the law would lead to an explosion of the
general and geriatric inmate populations, three strikes went to the voters
with the RAND study suggesting significant savings in costs to victims
as well as a decrease between 25% and 75% in actual spending on crime
prevention. 1°4 Similarly, throughout the campaign voters assumed that
three strikes would only put violent offenders-rapists and murders-
under its gambit. However, Proposition 184 also counted burglary and
drug possession as a strike.' 05 In the midst of all this, Proposition 184
was adopted by over 70% of the voters in an election marked by heavy
funding in support of three strikes.10
6
What eventually passed had provisions for both second and third
strikes. For those convicted of a second "serious felony," there is an
additional five years sentence sentence running consecutively to the cur-
rent conviction.10 7 For a third conviction of a serious offense, the sen-
tence is life imprisonment. 08 A serious offense included a broad variety
of criminal actions, ranging from murder, rape, and sodomy to the selling
of certain drugs.10 9 Finally, the three strikes law limits the ability to plea
bargain on three strikes by stipulating that the law "shall be applied in
every case." 110 However, the law still preserves the discretion of the
prosecutor to strike some prior felony conviction,"' while confining the
100 Id. at 420; Vitiello I, supra note 95, at 1675.
101 Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 419.
102 Id. at 419 n.137.
103 Id. at 419.
104 Vitiello H, supra note 95, at 1674-75. In fact, as Vitiello notes, scholars questioned
many of the assumptions that went into the Romero study. For example, he assumed that each
offender targeted by three strikes committed between 20 and 150 crimes per year and therefore
there would be significant social savings in reduced security, etc., as a result of incapacitating
these individuals. Similarly, one RAND study assumed some offenders committed over 600
offenses per year. Both the Romero and RAND study estimates far exceeded the median of 15
offenses per year that were more generally accepted by most in the criminological field. See
id. at 1674.
105 Id. at 1684.
106 Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 411.
107 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
108 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
109 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
110 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
11 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
No Joy IN MUDVILLE TONIGHT
role of the judge to cases where there is "insufficient evidence to prove
the prior felony conviction" for its application to three strikes.'
12
C. "ANOTHER FoUL BALL": THE VARIETY OF THREE STRIKES
LEGISLATION
In addition to California and Washington, the federal government
and twenty one other states passed their own versions of three strikes,
often times in political environments as heated as California's or feeling
the heat and publicity generated by Polly Klass' murder and California's
voter initiative and political activity surrounding three strikes. What re-
sulted in these states, though, can be described as a variety of three
strikes laws. In 1994 and 1995, 12 and 9 states respectively (including
California) adopted three strikes. The federal government also adopted
its own law in 1994. Alaska adopted its three strikes law in 1996.113 In
surveying these laws, one is struck by what is counted as a strike, what
the strike zone is, and what happened when one struck out.
1 4
For example, Georgia adopted a two strikes law that provided for
life imprisonment for a second felony conviction." 5 Some other states,
such as Arkansas, Montana, South Carolina, and Tennessee had two and
three strike provisions that provided for enhanced penalties for second
felony convictions."16 Thirteen other states, including California, Colo-
rado, and Connecticut had three strikes laws that provided for extended
sentences up to life imprisonment with no parole for a third felony con-
viction Two states, Florida and Maryland, adopted a four strikes law with
enhanced penalty provisions."17 Hence, the variety of strikes allowed
before penalty enhancement applied varied considerably.
What counted as a strike also varied. Some states only counted seri-
ous offenses that were violent, with violence subject to definition. 118
Other states included all felony convictions, while others included some
assortment or combination of felony convictions as a strike. The type of
enhancements also varied considerably, ranging from additional years in
prison, a higher mandatory minimum sentence, life in prison with a pos-
sibility for parole, to life without parole. 119 Finally, the various laws
112 Id.
113 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFEcrIVE CRIME POLICY, "THREE STRIEs": FrvE YEARS LATER 6
(1999)[hereafter "CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFEcrrvF CRnvM PoLIcY 1999"].
114 Id. at 6-9; see also Vitiello I, supra note 14, at 400-403. Vitiello provides a detailed
analysis of the various details and applications of three strikes law. Id. at 463-481. See also
Clark, supra note 94, at 6-13.
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mandated or limited judicial and prosecutorial discretion to apply the
three strikes, offering the ability to commit certain offenses or require
application of the three strikes law.
120
D. "FULL CoUNT'": SumMARY
Three strikes legislation in its various permutations was described
as a major innovation in law enforcement to reduce crime. Fueled by
public fears of crime and political exploitation of that fear, three strikes
legislation was supposed to cut down on violent crime, reduce sodial
costs of crime, and incarcerate more hardened criminals for longer peri-
ods of time. Three strikes laws were passed despite concerns about the
costs of such laws as well as the efficacy of mandatory minimum laws in
reducing crime.
III. THREE STRIKES STRIKES OUT
Adoption of three strikes in over twenty-two states and by the fed-
eral government from 1993 to 1995 was meant to be a major effort to-
wards reducing crime by locking up violent and habitual offenders who
were supposedly responsible for most of the crime that was occurring.
As a result, the supporters of three strikes assumed significant decreases
in crime and social savings. The critics argued that three strikes laws
would have little impact on crime, would increase prison costs and de-
crease capacity, and would produce large elderly prison populations.
What has been the impact of three strikes so far? Clearly it has neither
been all that supports-promised or all that critics feared. Its impact has
been mixed, and, overall, it is difficult to describe three strikes as a
success.
A. CRIME REDUCTION
Supporters of three strikes laws claimed that these laws were a nec-
essary crime control tool that would decrease violent crime by incarcerat-
ing more habitual offenders for longer periods of time. Since
'implementation of three strikes laws, crime rates nationally and region-
ally have decreased steadily. 121 Yet there is little evidence that three
strikes laws have had any appreciable effect on this crime reduction.
Perhaps the simplest way to measure the efficacy of three strikes is
first to look at the employment of the law in different states. Three
strikes has hardly been employed very much since adopted. In Washing-
ton, there have only been 121 convictions under the law through August
120 Id.
121 See Fox Butterfield, Prison Population Growing Although Crime Rate Drops,
N.Y.Tmms, Aug. 9, 1998, at A14.
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21, 1998, Florida had 116 as of June, 1998, and the United States has
had only 35 convictions through August, 1998.122 As of August, 1998,
in Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee
five or less individuals had been sentenced in each state under their three
strikes laws.123 Three individuals had been sentenced in Wisconsin, six
in New Jersey, and none in Utah under three strikes. 124 In the vast ma-
jority of the twenty two states and the federal government that have
adopted three strikes, the law's effect on crime is arguably minimal since
it is rarely used. The one exception is California where 4,468 offenders
have been sentenced under the third strike provision and over 36,043 for
a second strike offense. 125 This led California Governor Pete Wilson and
the Secretary of State to credit the law with significant impact on the
state's 6.5% drop in crime in 1994 and a 7% drop in 1995.126
There are several reasons to question the efficacy of these claims.
First, the crime rates in California were already decreasing even prior to
the adoption of the three strikes law and, thus, what may be occurring in
the state is simply a regression of high crime rates back towards a more
historic mean.127 In addition, there is no evidence that the three strikes
law precipitated any sudden or unique drop in the crime rate that might
not be associated with an intervening variable, thus, again questioning
the impact of the law. Third, studies supporting the efficacy of the law
have been "unidimensional" and have failed to account for other vari-
ables that might influence crime rates, e.g., changes in the economy, pop-
ulation, and the impact of other laws or trends influencing crime.' 28 In
fact, at least one study concluded that the three strikes laws did not have
much, if any, impact on the expected level of crime given the preexist-
ing trends in the state.
129
Fourth, if the aim of three strikes was to target violent felons, the
law has generally been unsuccessful because the "application of 'three
122 CAMPAIGN FOR EFFEcrIVE CRIMw PoLIcY1999, supra note 113, at 9.
123 Id.
124 Id.; see also 'Three-Strikes' Laws Proving More Show than Go, TRIAL, Jan. 1997, at
1;. see also Fox Butterfield, 'Three Strikes' Rarely Invoked in Courtrooms, N.Y.TIMEs, Sept.
10, 1996, at Al (providing earlier analysis of the implementation of three strikes laws).
125 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFEcTVa CRIME POLICY 1999, supra note 113, at 6.
126 Id.
127 EDWARD-R. TuFTm, DATA ANALYSIS FOR PoLIcs AND POLICY 56 (1974) (noting how
examination of statistics or samples with unusual "highs' or "lows" eventually will regress or
increase to approximate historic means or averages over time). Factors such as changes in the
economy, unemployment, drug usage, or gang activity could have led to the decline in crimi-
nal activity or crime could have simply been unusually high during the early 1990s for random
reasons and then simply fell to more historical norms.
128 Id.
129 Lisa Stolzenberg & Steward J. D'Alessio, Three Strikes and You're Out: The Impact
of California's New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, 93 CRIME & DELIN-
QuENCY 457 (1997).
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strikes' has occurred in far more cases involving marijuana users than in
cases involving violent felons." 130 Evidence suggests that nonviolent of-
fenders and drug offenses predominate as the major triggers implicating
three strikes. For example, one study indicating that 85% of those con-
victed under the law were convicted for nonviolent and drug offenses.
131
In fact, during the first eight months of California's three strikes law,
70% of those sentenced under it were for nonviolent and drug related
offenses, and 41% of those subject to three strikes were there because of
a property offense as opposed to 17% of those who committed a second
strike felony offense. 132 Overall, while the law was meant to target vio-
lent felonies, it has failed to do so for the most part, again calling into
question its efficacy in reducing California's violent crime rate.
Perhaps the law has had an impact on deterrence. The 1994 RAND
study on the California three strikes law claimed savings as a result of
the 340,000 crimes deterred. 133 However, one study indicated that 83%
of the robbers caught and facing potential sentencing under three strikes
did not expect to be caught, 134 and 80% of another sample of felons
stated that they had no idea that they were subject to three strikes.
135
There is little evidence that the law deters because either criminals do not
know of the law, or they simply believe they will not be caught. Overall,
these studies confirm what many criminologists already knew, including
what Zimring and Hawkins found in their study-many crimes are not
calculated on the basis of the severity of punishment and that perhaps the
certainty and not the severity of being caught is a far more important.
136
Finally, if three strikes has had an impact on deterrence, the data does not
show it, and, as noted above, any change in California's crime rate can
be attributed to factors exogenous to the adoption of three strikes.
Overall, there is no clear evidence that three strikes has secured its
single most important criminological objective of reducing violent
crime.137
130 Vitiello II, supra note 95, at 1703.
131 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECIVE CRIME PoLIcY, THE IMPACr OF 'THREE STIKES AND
YOU'RE Otr" LAWS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 6 (1996) [hereinafter "CAMPAIGN FOR EF-
FEcrrvE CRIME POLICY 1996"); TRIAL, supra note 124, at 12; Vitiello II, supra note 95, at
1703. See also CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIvE CRIME POLICY 199, supra note 113, at 13.
132 Vitiello I, supra note 95, at n. 244.
133 CAMPAIGN FOR EFFECTIVE CRIME POLICY 1996, supra note 131, at 2.
134 Id. at 2.
135 Id.
136 The classic debate on whether certainty or severity of punishment is critical to deter-
rence can be traced to C.B. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CReMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1778) versus
JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1948).
137 Vitiello I, supra note 95, at 433.
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B. LEGAL IMPACT
A second way to examine the impact of three strikes is to determine
its legal impact. There are three dimensions to this claim.
1. Uneven Application of Three Strikes
First, three strikes appears to have achieved certain unanticipated
effects. Three strikes seems to have been applied differently in various
areas, for example, prosecutors in California's more populous counties
more likely to strike some offenses than others. 38 Studies also indicate
that local political pressures seem to determine the use of three strikes. 139
In addition, the lack of flexibility has discouraged prosecutors from using
these laws, and they prefer to employ other preexisting habitual offender
laws already on the books. 1
40
Second, there is some evidence that three strikes has influenced plea
bargain and trial costs and behavior. For example, in Los Angeles, 4%
of all felonies generally go to trial, yet 25% of the three strikes are going
to trial. x41 Even though 45% of all three strikes are still plea bargained,
the significant increase in demands for trials under the California law
suggests that defendants charged under the law seek a trial in hope for
acquittal instead of opting for the certainty of enhanced sentences under
the second or third strike. Further, in time, as more defendants face en-
hanced penalties under the law, they may be less likely to plea to even a
first strike, let alone subsequent strikes, to escape the law. The result, as
already demonstrated in California, is more trials, more public costs for
prosecutors, and more costs associated with public defenders who repre-
sent most of those coming to bat for three strike felonies.
Third, because three strikes is leading to more criminal trials, there
is some evidence that civil trials are being delayed to accommodate the
speedy trial provisions required for criminal trials. 142
C. CONSrrUTIONAL CHALLENGES
1. Federal Law
A second dimension in which three strikes has had an impact on the
law and legal process is in terms of challenges to its constitutionality.
For example, general constitutional challenges have been raised against
138 CAMPAIGN FOR EFFECTIvE CRIME POLICY 1996, supra note 131, at 4.
139 Id.
140 'Three-Strikes' Laws Proving More Show than Go, TRIAL, Jan.. 1997, at 12. See also
Fox Butterfield, 'Three Strikes' Rarely Invoked in Courtrooms, N.Y.Tmfas, Sept.10, 1996, at
Al.
'41 Jeffrey L. Rabin, '3 Strikes' Proving Tough on Legal System, Study Says, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 1996, at Al.
142 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFm'crivW CRIME POLICY 1996, supra note 131, at 6.
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the federal law in several cases, but courts have rejected many of these
claims. 143
Perhaps the most serious challenge to the federal three strikes oc-
curred in United States v. Kaluna.144 In Kaluna, the issue was whether
the statutory burdenshifting procedure used to determine a third strike
was constitutional. The court rejected the general challenge to the three
strikes law, but held that the burden-shifting provision of the law did
violated the Due Process Clause of the Federal constitution. In contrast,
in United States v. Wicks' 45 the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitution-
ality of 18 U.S.C. §3559(c). This section of the federal three strikes law
requires a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
neither a dangerous weapon nor death or bodily injury had occurred in
certain previous offenses so that in sentencing a prior strike would not be
considered as a previous violent felony. In Wickes the court upheld the
burden-shifting procedure, reasoning that the shift of a burden was per-
missible because the defendant's sentence was an exception to the gen-
eral sentencing policy, and, in general, it was allowable for the defendant
to bear the burden to exceptions to sentencing policy so long as the pros-
ecutor proved all of the elements to the crime. 1
46
Kaluna reached a decision contrary to the Wicks. Instead of view-
ing the defendant's burden as requiring him to demonstrate that his sen-
tence was an exception to general sentencing policy, the Kaluna court
held that the issue of whether a dangerous weapon was used was an es-
sential element of the crime that the prosecutor had to prove to establish
that an offense qualified as a serious felony. 147 Because it was an ele-
ment of the crime, the government must carry the burden of proving it, 148
and shifting the burden to rebut to the defendant was unconstitutional.149
So far Kaluna is the only decision that successfully attacked the
constitutionality of the federal three strikes laws, and it was withdrawn
by the Ninth Circuit in 1998 pending an en bane ruling.' 50
143 See, e.g., United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222 (5' Cir. 1997) (holding that federal
three strikes law does not violate either the separation of powers or ex post facto principles of
the Constitution); and United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3rd 836 (8" Cir. 1996) (federal three
strikes law does not violate either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution).
144 United States v. Kaluna, 152 F.3d 1069 (9' Cir. 1998).
145 United States v. Wicks, 132 F.3d 383 (7" Cir. 1997).
146 Id. at 389.
147 Kaluna, 152 F.3d at 1069
148 See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1228 (1998).
149 Kaluna, 152 F.3d at 1073.
150 United States v. Kaluna, 161 F.3d 628 (9"' Cir. 1998).
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2. State Law
There have been several challenges to state three strikes laws, but
again, challenges to the California law have been the most persistent and
prevalent.
Generally, challenges to the state laws have been upheld under the
relaxed proportionality standards the Court laid down in Harmelin v.
Michigan.15' However, so far these challenges have mainly been made
under the federal constitution, with state constitutional challenges yet to
come. In addition, given the racial impact of three strikes, 152 equal pro-
tection challenges are sure to be raised even though disparate impact
claims are hard to sustain in federal court.
Constitutional separation of powers issues led to the invalidation of
part of the California three strikes in San Diego County v. Romero. 5 3 At
issue in this case was whether the provision of the three strikes law that
gave prosecutors the power to strike prior offenses but which denied the
power to judges to dismiss prior felonies in the interest of justice violated
the state constitutional separation of powers provisions. In ruling that
trial judges might dismiss prior felony convictions absent prosecutorial
motions, the California Supreme Court stated that "dismissal" is a judi-
cial rather than a executive function, 154 and that this power cannot be
conditioned upon approval of a district attorney. 155 The proposals to
overturn the California Supreme Court decision were not successful.
The impact of Romero is hard to estimate, yet it is possible that judges
may strike many prior offenses to avoid what they perceive to be dispro-
portionate or unfair sentences. 156 The result in Pomero might lessen the
impact of three strikes law on sentencing, as well as, perhaps, a further
change in plea bargaining and trial requests although data on either is
lacking.
Besides Romero, the United States Supreme Court has twice denied
challenges to various applications of the California three strikes law. In
Monge v. California157 the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the
Double Jeopardy Clause applied to sentencing decisions in noncapital
151 See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1997) (upholding the imposition of the
mandatory minimum terms under the state habitual offender statute to be permissive and not
mandatory). But cf State v. Lindsey, 554 N.W. 2d 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (sentencing
under the state three strikes laws is required and not permissive).
152 See infra Part III.F.
153 People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
'54 Id. at 446-47.
155 Id.
156 See also California v. Garcia, 976 P.2d 831, 835 (Cal. 1999) (holding that state judges
have the authority and limited discretion to strike prior convictions so long as the reasons for
the striking were not to accommodate judicial convenience, to express antipathy to the three
strikes law, or because the defendant pled guilty).
157 People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Cal. 1998).
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cases. In reaching that opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished non-
capital from capital cases since in Bullington v. Missouri158 the Supreme
Court had previously ruled that a capital defendant who had received a
life sentence could not subsequently receive the death penalty upon re-
trial following an appeal. Noting that Bullington was an exception, the
Supreme Court in Monge stated that, in general, sentencing decisions did
not implicate the Double Jeopardy provision, and, therefore, the Califor-
nia law could consider past crimes and sentences when determining a
sentence for a third strike.
In addition, in Riggs v. California'59 the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in a case that asked whether the sentence violated the proportion-
ality rule found in Harmelin. In Riggs, a defendant who stole a bottle of
vitamins from a store was sentenced to 25 years to life because he had
one prior offense. Had he not had this prior offense, the theft of the
vitamins would have been classified as a misdemeanor with a fine or
sentence up to six months. The existence of the prior crime required the
trial court to treat this theft as a felony and, thus, impose the minimum 25
years to life. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in part because of
lack of clarity on what role Riggs' criminal record played into his sen-
tencing. Hence, Riggs had to await state court disposition on this issue.
Other states have had litigation similar to that of California's. In
Wisconsin, a life sentence for a third strike that was a second degree
sexual assault was held not be disproportionate under the state's cruel
and unusual punishment clause.1 60 Similarly, in that case the court re-
jected claims that the three strikes statute violated the state constitutional
separation of powers doctrine. 161 In Georgia, ex post facto claims have
been rejected. 162 In Louisiana, separation of powers, 163 ex post facto, 164
and double jeopardy 165 challenges to the state's three strikes laws have
been rejected. Paralleling the Wicks opinion, in State v. Denomes166 a
Louisiana court held that placing the burden on the defendant to demon-
strate that a prior conviction should not count as a strike is not a constitu-
tional violation. In New Jersey, ex post facto claims have been
rejected, 167 and in Washington it was held that due process did not re-
158 Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444-46 (1981).
159 Riggs v.Califomia, 119 S. Ct. 890, 890 (1999)(denying certiorari because neither the
California Supreme Court nor any federal tribunal addressed this question).
160 State v. Lindsey, 554 N.W.2d 215, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
161 Id.
162 Johnson v. State, 493 S.E.2d 926, 927 (Ga. Ct. App.1997).
163 State v. Toliver, 635 So.2d 1190, 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
164 State v. Keys, 694 So.2d 1107, 1114-15 (La. . Ct. App. 1997).
165 State v. Kennerson, 702 So.2d 867, 871 (La.. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Richardson,
637 So.2d 709, 715 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
166 State v. Denomes, 674 So.2d 465, 468-69 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
167 State v. Oliver, 689 A.2d 876, 879-80 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
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quire a defendant to be separately charged with having violated the three
strikes laws.
168
Overall, states three strikes adjudication consistently rejects any
constitutional claims of defendants.
D. DEINING WHAT CouNTs AS A STRIKE
Another issue in state litigation is what counts as a strike for the
purposes of three strikes laws.
First, the records are mixed regarding whether juvenile records
count as a strike. For example, in some states juvenile ofenses may not
be considered as a strike while in others that is not the case.169 In Cali-
fornia, a court held in People v. Daniels170 that juvenile records of seri-
ous or violent crimes may count as a strike. This decision is troubling
because in California juveniles are not always entitled to jury trials or
bail and, thus, some individuals may be sentenced based upon prior of-
fenses that did not offer them the same due process they would have been
afforded were they adults.
In addition, in People v. Hazelton17' the California Supreme Court
ruled that out-of-state felony convictions may be counted as a strike be-
cause the voters did not intend to limit strikes to instate offenses, even
though the ballot proposition that instituted three strikes was not clear on
this issue.1
72
Overall, what counts as a strike is not clear and may conflict with
some basic principles of due process, and may be not what voters had in
mind when the law was adopted.
E. PRISON CAPACITY AND COSTS
Critics of three strikes claimed that these laws would lead to an
explosion in prison costs and to prison overcrowding. The infrequent use
of three strikes laws by twenty two states and in the federal government
means that the few people who were sentenced under these laws have not
increased costs or contributed in prison overcrowding in any meaningful
way. In California, a 1994 study predicted that three strikes would be the
single most important variable affecting prison costs in terms of capacity,
health care costs for geriatric prisoners, and prison construction.'
7 3
While over 40,000 defendants have been sentenced under the second or
168 State v. Thome, 129 Wash. 2d 736, 779-81 (1996).
169 Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment, 81 JUDICATURE
206, 210 (1998).
170 People v. Daniels, 51 Cal. App. 4' 520, 525-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
171 People v. Hazelton, 929 P.2d 423, 425-27 (Cal. 1996).
172 Id. at 427.
173 CAMPAIGN FOR AN Es-acnvE CRIuM POLICY 1996, supra note 131, at 8.
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third strike provisions of the three strikes law, the real costs of their con-
tainment have not shown up yet, and it may take ten or more years before
that occurs. The reason is that 13,000 defendants sentenced under two
strikes will not begin to serve their extra second strike time for a few
years. Also, those sentenced under the third strike provision will not have
their costs born out until the space that would be used for them comes at
the expense of other defendants, or when their geriatric health care costs
must be born by the state. At present, the evidence suggests that due to
the lack of the use of the law in all but one jurisdiction there is no signif-
icant prison or incarceration costs, and in the case of California, the costs
have yet to be materialized.
In addition, it is predicted that previous sentencing reforms, a tight-
ening of parole, and truth-in-sentencing laws will have a greater impact
on prison capacity and future prison population than three strikes wil.
174
Hence, in determining of future costs associated with prison maintenence
and occupancy, many other factors besides the three strikes need to be
examined and considered as possibly more determinative.
One area where incarceration costs have increased is the cost of
pretrial detention. Because many three strikers are either unable or ineli-
gible to make bail and more of them demand trials, local jails have be-
come more crowded. Consequently, the costs associated with housing
more individuals awaiting trials and providing more security personnel to
guard these individuals have increased. 175 For example, in California
there is an 11% increase in pretrial detention in local jails as a result of
three strikes. 176 The cost of increased pretrial detention which was
neither anticipated nor estimated when the three strikes laws were evalu-
ated is one more expense that must be considered in evaluating the cost
of three strikes.
Another way to calculate the prison costs associated with three
strikes laws is to compare the costs of incarceration to that of nonin-
carceration [traditional] punishments. For example, a RAND drug policy
study of mandatory minimums for drug offenses found that incarceration
sentences were more expensive than both traditional sentences and drug
treatment programs. 177 Given that many defendants sentenced under
three strikes were sentenced for drug offenses, evidence suggests that
174 James Austin, The Effect of "Three Strikes and You're Out" on Corrections, in T1REE
STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: VENGEANCE AS PUBLIC POLICY 155, 170-71 (David Shichor &
Dale K. Sechrest eds., 1997).
175 Kelly McMurry, Three-Strikes Laws Having More Show than Go, TRIAL, Jan. 1997, at
13.
176 Dale Parent, Key Legislative Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory Sentencing, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN ACTION 1, 3 (Jan. 1997).
177 RAND, ARE MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES CosT-EFFECnvE?, RAND
DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER RESEARCH BRIEF RB-6003 (1997).
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three strikes is not a cost- effective means to address drug and drug re-
lated crimes.
Overall, it is unclear whether three strikes provide any social sav-
ings. Instead it appears that three strikes laws are more expensive than
traditional sentencing schemes.
F. RACIAL IMPACT
Prior to the adoption of three strikes law there were no studies on
the racial impact of these laws upon sentencing or prison populations. In
the jurisdictions that have adopted three strikes, the infrequent use of
these laws has made any meaningful racial analysis difficult. However,
California's use of three strikes demonstrates that racial minorities are
more likely to feel the impact of three strikes than non-minorities. While
African-Americans constitute only 7% of the California's total popula-
tion and 20% of individuals arrested for felony crimes, they constitute
43% of those sentenced under the three strikes law. 178 Caucasians, on
the other hand, comprise 53% of the state population and 33% of the
individuals arrested for felonies, but they constitute less than 25% of all
those sentenced under three strikes. 179 Overall, one study concluded that
in California "African-Americans are being sent to prison.. .more than
thirteen times as often as whites" under the three strikes law.' 80
Still is difficult to argue that three strikes laws are the cause of this
disparate impact upon African-Americans. The war on drugs, which in-
cludes enhanced penalties for possessing and selling crack, has already
increased the likelihood that African-Americans and other racial minori-
ties will face felony prosecution and convictions both in greater percent-
ages and numbers than caucasians.' 8 'Similarly, policing practices that
target racial minorities also increase the likelihood that members of mi-
nority groups will be affected by three strikes more than whites, poten-
tially subjecting them to more arrests, prosecutions, and convictions that
can be counted as strikes. 182 These laws just enhance an already dispa-
178 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EF'iEcnvE CRmm PoLIcY 1996, supra note 131, at 7.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See David Schultz, Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies 25 TEX. TECH L. REv.
151, 157-66 (1993) (discussing of the racial impact and social costs associated with the war on
drugs).
182 See, e.g., Jennifer A. Larrabee, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection:
77te Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J. L. & POL'Y. 291, 293-94 (1997)
(noting the practice of Blacks being stopped by the police solely on account of race). See also
Iver Peterson, Whitman Concedes Troopers Use Race in Stopping Drivers, N.Y. TRMES, Apr.
21, 1999, at Al (reporting that New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman and the Attor-
ney General Peter G. Vemiero acknowledged that state troopers has singled out black and
Hispanic motorists to stop along the highway and that "77% or more of those asked to consent
to a search of their vehicle during a stop are minorities.").
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rate racial impact on sentencing and prison population. Hence, three
strikes will simply compound existing racial disparity, putting more
members of minority groups to prisons for longer periods of time.
Unfortunately, efforts to challenge three strikes federal on equal
protection grounds will probably fail. The Supreme Court has already
rejected equal protection claims based on disparate impact on death pen-
alty sentencing 8 3 and in the use of prosecutorial discretion to charge
individuals. 184 In both cases, the Supreme Court has demanded a partic-
ularized showing of discrimination, not simply a statistical demonstration
of impact. Whatever primary or contributory impact three strikes has on
the racial composition of prisons or the application of the law, it is un-
likely that the federal courts will intervene.
G. SOCIAL SAVINGS
Three strikes laws were supposed to produce significant social sav-
ings by decreasing crime. For the federal government and the twenty-
one states (excluding California) that passed three strikes, any savings
are either insignificant or impossible to estimate. California estimates, as
noted earlier, were that there would be a total savings of $23 billion
dollars by the year 2000 resulting from decreased security costs and ex-
penses by crime victims.
It is impossible to conclude that three strikes has led to any savings
in California either. First, since one cannot definitely attribute any drop
in the state's crime rate to the law itself, it is impossible to link any
decrease in victims' expenses or savings on security or insurance, if any,
to the law. Second, there is no indications that insurance rates, security
expenses, or money spent to help victims of crimes have decreased.
Third, any social savings that might have resulted from three strikes
might well be offset by additional expenses in implementing these laws.
These implementational expenses, as noted earlier, result from additional
trials, legal fees, and incarceration costs. In addition, depending on how
one defines social costs, implementing a law that exacerbates racial dis-
parities in the criminal justice system adds to the distrust that some have
toward the law and society. Such distrust, while difficult to quantify in a
pecuniary sense, adds to racism whether it be the reality or perception in
our society.
Finally, one more cost associated with the implementation of three
strikes may be an increase in violence against police by offenders seek-
ing to avoid arrest under three strikes. Some claim that repeat offenders
have an additional incentive to elude capture by police in order to avoid
183 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987).
184 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456 (1996).
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the enhanced penalty provisions of the law. Studies from Fresno, Califor-
nia, and Seattle, Washington, suggest that increased violence against po-
lice by offenders was motivated by three strikes. 185 However, while
three strikes may account for part of this increased violence against ar-
resting officers, these studies are not conclusive. First, these studies
comprise only two cities that have adopted three strikes. In many cases,
such as Los Angeles, where three strikes is used more than anywhere
else, there is no evidence of increased violence against police during
arrest. Second, even if violence has increased, there is little evidence
linking violence to three strikes. Third, given other studies that have
suggested that many offenders did not think three strikes would apply to
them, it is arguable that many facing arrest are unaware of the applicabil-
ity of the law to them and, hence, elude capture for reasons other than
three strikes. Thus, the evidence is inconclusive on whether the adoption
of three strikes laws has led to increased violence against police.
CONCLUSION: "MIGHTY CASEY HAS STRUCK OUT."
As a crime control policy, there is little evidence that three strikes
has reduced violent crime or produced the social savings that its backers
claimed. At the same time, so far the law has not resulted in over-
crowded prisons full of aging criminals, so many of the concerns of its
critics have failed to materialize at this time. However, not anticipated
by either the proponents or critics of three strikes, are the effects three
strikes has had on civil trials, plea bargaining, jail capacity, and the racial
composition of prisons. Overall, implementation of three strikes has
proved to be less and more than what most people expected, yielding
mixed results.
In terms of public policy, one can argue that three strikes was
doomed to fail. Zimring and Hawkins' work on mandatory sentences, as
well as states' studies on the same topic, should have provided good
evidence of the likely impact of three strikes and the types of sentences
might reduce the number of violent crimes. Unfortunately, what is often
good social science research is not always good campaign rhetoric.
Three strikes is an example of policy devoid of a good evidentiary basis
for its enactment, rendering the law valuable mostly in terms of its sym-
bolism and ability to mobilize crime-fearful voters at the polls.
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185 CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFEcrrvE CRum POLICY 1996, supra note 131, at 3.
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